This collision with the loss of 32 lives, the sinking of the Sanchi and the spillage of its oil cargo and fuel has been one of the most disastrous collisions at sea in recent years. This article is a tribute to the lives lost that day.
I also intend to share my key takeaways from the reading of the investigation report with some suggestions to add on top of the recommendations in the report. We owe it to the deceased seafarers and their families that we find ways to prevent such casualties from happening again.
Why did the ships collide?
The navigators on both ships did not act as required by the international collision regulations.
Where did it happen?
In the East China Sea, about 160 nautical miles east of Shanghai – one of the world’s biggest collision hot-spots due to the heavy density of commercial shipping and fishing traffic. However, these are still open waters and the visibility on that day was good.
What happened?
Sanchi on a Northerly course was the give-way vessel to the CF Crystal which was on its starboard bow on a South-Westerly course. However, from the time that the CF Crystal was first sighted by the Sanchi, until the collision 26 minutes later, the bearing of the CF Crystal was steady at around 2 points on Sanchi’s starboard bow- which means the risk of collision was evident from the beginning but no action was taken by either ship.
Track of the Sanchi (red) and the CF Crystal (blue) from nearly the time they were first observed by each other. The magenta line indicates the relative bearings of the ships from each other which remained almost unchanged. This is a clear indication of the risk of collision that existed from the very beginning.
When did it happen?
6th January 2018 at 1950 hours local time (UTC + 8)
How did it happen?
The Voyage Data Recorder and the investigation report helps us recreate what happened on the Navigating Bridge of both these ships leading to the collision.
On the Sanchi the Third Officer (3/O) and an Able Seaman (AB) were on watch, while on the CF Crystal, the Chief Officer (C/O) and a lookout (LO) were on duty.
Collision – 50 minutes
The Sanchi’s 3/O takes over from the 2nd Officer (2/O). However, the 3/O spends 14 minutes in the chart-room with the 2/O talking about non-watch related topics.
C - 26 min
CF Crystal first appears on radar screen of the Sanchi at a distance of around 9.8 nautical miles (nm). Sanchi’s speed is 10.4 knots. The radar is set up at a 6 nm range scale in off-centre relative motion. Several vessels and boats are observed crossing Sanchi’s starboard bow. The 3/O actually starts assessing the navigation situation only at C-22 minutes.
C - 21 min
The Sanchi's 3/O orders the AB to keep the signalling light ready and tells him to “just relax”
C - 19
On the Sanchi, the 3/O assesses the Bow Crossing Range (BCR) of the two targets on his starboard bow and deems that his own ship will pass ahead of the CF Crystal and the other target, the fishing vessel Zhedaiyu 03187. The BCR readout is from the AIS input into the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid and not the preferable acquisition of the radar echo.
Meanwhile, on the CF Crystal, the Chief Officer observes Sanchi at about 7 nm on her own port side. Similar to the Sanchi, he is also reading off the information from the AIS input into the ARPA and finds the Sanchi’s CPA to be 0.9nm, calculated to pass ahead of his own ship’s bow. The speed of the CF Crystal is 13.2 knots.
C - 16
The CF Crystal adjusts the course 8 degrees to starboard to bring the vessel back to the course line. The Sanchi is now 6nm away.
C - 15
On the Sanchi, the cursor of X-band radar is shifted to CF Crystal. The lookout mentions a vessel showing red & green. This is the CF Crystal presenting a clear collision risk. However, no action is taken.
C - 14 min
The Zhedaiyu 03187 calls Sanchi on VHF channel 16. But the 3/O on the Sanchi not only ignores the calls but comments to the AB that ‘Oh, he's talking to another one. You know, never answer these calls. Because if you don't answer, it is not ok to action. But if you answer, he seems … he confirms with you about his action. So he takes action, whatever he said in the radio and you don't understand. But if you don’t answer, he shall be forced to take action to make himself clear, understand?
Also at the time, the radar displays the flashing AIS Collision warning for both Zhedaiyu 03187 and the CF Crystal. The distance between the Sanchi and the CF Crystal is now only 5.3nm with each proceeding at full speed.
The radar picture from the Sanchi at C-14. Notice the AIS collision alarm on the lower right corner.
C - 9
The 3/O on the Sanchi asks the AB to flash the Aldis lamp at the Zhedaiyu 03187. Though it is the Sanchi that must take action as per the COLREGS, it is the Zhedaiyu 03187 that ultimately alters course to port and avoids the collision. However, the risk of collision with the CF Crystal still remains.
C - 8
On the CF Crystal, the CO completes the 8-degree course adjustment but now finds the Sanchi only 3.1 nm away with a CPA of 0.4 nm. It’s interesting to note that the C/O still cannot see the radar echo of the Sanchi but gets these readings from the AIS input into the ARPA.
What is more interesting to note is that the CO assumes that this target with 0.4nm CPA is a small vessel without risk of collision.
C - 7
On the CF Crystal, the 3/O comes up on the Bridge to take over his watch from the C/O. The 3/O checks the ship’s position on the paper chart and then uses the radar to check the traffic situation. He finds two AIS targets on the X-band radar (not echoes).
C - 6
The 3/O on the Sanchi comments to the AB that ‘it’s a hard situation’.
C - 5
The distance between the two ships is just 2 miles. The ships are still maintaining their courses and full speeds.
On the Sanchi, the 3/O asks the AB to flash the Aldis lamp at the CF Crystal. He is probably expressing his conundrum, when he speaks to the AB, ‘...we have this one on our starboard side. We should take action. But what action can I take in this situation? Starboard side is full.’ What he means by the starboard side is full is the Zhedaiyu 03187 which is now almost abeam of the Sanchi on the starboard side.
On the CF Crystal, the C/O is unaware of the impending collision. He takes a phone call from the Master.
C - 4
The Zhedaiyu 03187 has passed astern of the Sanchi. The CF Crystal is now bearing down upon the Sanchi.
The Sanchi is still flashing the Aldis lamp at the CF Crystal.
The AB on the Sanchi says to the 3/O: ‘Charlie is passed, right? A little to starboard?
3/O: Starboard? Why?
AB: What's the CPA? CPA is … zero, zero
3/O: ...It's a small vessel, right?
AB: No, big vessel.
3/O: So why is she intending to take action like this?
On the CF Crystal, the C/O hands over the watch to the 3/O without mentioning the risk of collision with the Sanchi. In fact, he tells him that the traffic is clear. Neither the 3/O or the CO see the flashing Aldis light from the Sanchi. The C/O has already left the Bridge. The 3/O’s lookout (LO) has also come on the Bridge.
C - 2
On the Sanchi, the 3/O calls the Master over the phone ‘We get a target on starboard side and CPA is zero. Distance is very short. It's a big vessel.’
On the CF Crystal, the LO reminds the 3/O that the Sanchi’s AIS target is showing a CPA of 0.2 nm. The 3/O observes the target by radar and assumes it to be a small vessel.
C-1
Sanchi 3/O: Oh, why is she not doing anything? Oh man, he's touching.
Go to port side, full port side. Oh, man! Full starboard side, full starboard side. Full, full, please.
The CF Crystal AB reminds the 3/O that the CPA of the target is 0.1 nm. The 3/O asks the LO to change the steering from autopilot to hand steering. The 3/O then orders starboard rudder without giving a specific rudder order. The lookout reports to the OOW when the rudder angle reaches starboard 20.
32 seconds to collision
Sanchi’s Captain comes to the Bridge.
3/O: Captain, she did not take any action.
Captain: Hard to starboard, hard to starboard.
Collision
CF Crystal’s bow hits the Sanchi’s starboard side between No.2 and No.3 starboard ballast tanks and breaches her cargo tanks, resulting in the leakage of condensate oil and a consequent fire and explosion. The captain requests to switch on all deck lights and orders the helmsman to steer “hard to port". The Sanchi sends a distress message.
C + 2
An explosion and fire engulfs the Bridge and Accommodation. The last sounds picked up by the microphone of the Voyage Data Recorder are the suffocation sounds of the seafarers on the Bridge.
On the CF Crystal, the bow and covers of the forward holds are severely damaged. The Captain has rushed to the Bridge and gives the order for ‘full astern’, followed by Abandon Ship. He is too overwhelmed to save the information on the Voyage Data Recorder. The crew are evacuated through the free fall lifeboat on the stern of the vessel and later rescued by the fishing boat Zhedaiyu 03187.
Photos of the fireball that erupted on the Sanchi immediately after the collision. The fire also affected part of the CF Crystal. All photos in this article are taken from the official investigation report.
As part of the findings of the official report, China and Hong Kong conclude the following:
As the give-way vessel in the crossing situation, Sanchi did not take actions to keep well clear of CF Crystal according to Rule 15 and 16 of the COLREGS. This was the main causal factor of the collision.
As the stand-on vessel in the crossing situation, CF Crystal failed to take actions to avoid collision according to the requirements of Rule 17 of the COLREGS. This was also a causal factor of the collision.
Other findings about the conduct of navigation on the Sanchi:
(1) During avoiding collision with small vessels, the 3/O attitude was negative. He expected the small vessels to take action even though Sanchi was a give way vessel.
(2) Before the accident, the AB on duty repeatedly reminded the 3/O to take action, but the latter was too confident and did not take action.
(3) The 3/O stayed in the chart room for too long, leaving only the AB as the sole lookout in the bridge.
(4) 3/O talked with the AB about things that had nothing to do with navigation.
The Iranian delegation participating the casualty investigation points out that the alteration of CF Crystal's course to starboard starting 15 minutes prior to the collision developed the situation into a collision, which would have otherwise been clear. They also criticised the conduct of navigation on the CF Crystal as:
1. CF Crystal's watchkeeping personnel had not noticed the Sanchi’s presence up to the time of collision.
2. Both of the vessels had not noticed the change in navigational status of the other.
3. AIS had been used on board CF Crystal as the sole means of collision avoidance.
4. CF Crystal had not noticed the flashing signals given by the Sanchi.
5. No proper hand-over/take-over had occurred between the CF Crystal’s whatchkeeping personnel.
6. Improper use of the AIS was observed as a navigational aid in not identifying the surrounding vessels.
All the investigating parties however agreed on two points (a) that both ships failed to keep proper lookout as required by rule-5 of the COLREG 1972, and (b) that both ships failed to determine if risk of collision existed as required by rule-7 of the COLREGS.
I agree on all the points raised by the investigating team. It will be a few months before the proportionality of the blame will be decided by the Admiralty court. Going by a study of past cases, I reckon that the major part of the blame will be apportioned to the Sanchi- though that is not the focus of this article.
Neither is this the first time such collisions have occurred. Just in this area of the East China Sea, I can list at least three such collisions- the Hyundai Dominion with the Sky Hope, the COSCO Hong Kong with the fish transportation vessel Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135 and the CMA CGM Florida with Chou Shan. In many of these cases, the lights and targets of the commercial vessels were obscured by that of the numerous fishing vessels in the area.
In addition to the measures suggested by these official reports, I would like to express my own specific recommendations on reducing such collisions: Issue clear standing orders across the fleet. I’ve used this strategy with much success in the past and I will share some of them here. Keep in mind that this is not an exhaustive list but only ones I don’t normally find on ships.
Specific instructions for the fleet navigation standing orders:
- Take early avoidance action in accordance with COLREGS. As a guidance, action should be taken:
At minimum 5 nm distance from the other ship/ target. - If by 4 nm, the Officer of Watch (OOW) is unable to take avoiding action or unable to ensure a CPA as per the below table, for whatever reason (e.g. due to the presence of another vessel), the OOW should call the Master.
- Final CPA with a TCPA of 15 minutes should be:
- Navigation Area: Minimum CPA
- Ocean Passage: 2 nm
- Coastal Waters (12 nm from land): 1 nm
- Traffic Separation Scheme: 0.5 nm
- This minimum CPA also includes passing distances in an overtaking situation. - Reduce speed to avoid close-quarter situations if alteration of course alone cannot provide the required CPA. Every OOW must be aware and confident of reducing the speed to avoid collision.
- Keep well clear of groups of fishing boats. This is preferable to a zig-zag course within a fishing fleet formation.
- On the conduct of the navigation-watch:
- During change of watch, especially in hours of darkness- sufficient time must be given to the relieving officer to adjust their eyesight and assess the navigation situation. Change of watch shall not be carried out when the outgoing OOW is engaged in a collision avoidance manoeuvre or course alteration.
- At least 90% of the time on watch should be spent on lookout (visual, radar, ECDIS). At least one radar shall be used along with other appropriate navigation aids at all times during the navigation watch. Paperwork not related to watchkeeping shall not be carried out during the watch. Computers and mobile phones are not allowed on the Bridge during navigation.
- Always proceed at safe speed, i.e. speed appropriate for the navigation situation. When in doubt, slow down.
- Allow for reduction of speed due to weather, adverse currents, traffic congestion and safe navigation when calculating the ETA to the next port.
- Identify sea-areas in which the Bridge Watch level must be escalated.
I do also think the abandonship order given by the Captain of the CF Crystal was premature, but this will be a discussion for another article. To their credit, the crew of the CF Crystal did return to their ship to help put out the fire.
Lastly, I cannot but help recall a passage from my own book Golden Stripes – Leadership on the High Seas ‘People tend to make assumptions when they have incomplete information. They use assumptions to fill these gaps in awareness, thus creating a poor interpretation of reality. Ship collisions have time and again occurred because the navigators thought they had the right of way, each navigator assuming that the other would steer clear of his ship!’
If you’d like to know more or discuss about such standing orders, or about the book, get in touch with me at
Safe seas and fair winds!
References:
- Report (dated 10th May 2018) on the Investigation of the Collision between M.T. Sanchi and M.V. CF Crystal in East China Sea on 6 January 2018, as available on IMO GISIS. (link)
- Report on the collision of the Hyundai Dominion and the Sky Hope (link)
- Report on the collision of the COSCO Hong Kong and the fish transportation vessel Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135 East China Sea resulting in the loss of 11 lives (link)
- Report on the collision of the CMA CGM Florida and Chou Shan 140 miles east of Shanghai, East China Sea (link)
- Golden Stripes- Leadership on the High Seas, Captain VS Parani, Whittles Publishing
